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Abstract 
 
 
The paper illustrates the use of real options and game theory principles to value 
prototypical investment projects and capture important competitive/strategic 
dimensions in a step-by-step analysis of investment decisions (options) under 
uncertainty. It first illustrates the application of real options principles to a mining 
concession and to an R&D program. It then provides examples from innovation cases 
and uses basic game theory principles to discuss other strategic and competitive 
aspects, especially applicable to oligopolistic industries like consumer electronics. 
The issue of whether (and when) it is optimal to compete independently or 
coordinate/collaborate (e.g., via joint R&D ventures or strategic alliances) is given 
particular attention.  
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REAL OPTIONS: EXAMPLES AND PRINCIPLES  
OF VALUATION AND STRATEGY  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 This paper provides an overview of the basic principles of quantifying the 
value of corporate real options and of capturing important strategic dimensions, which 
are at the core of strategic planning and investing under uncertainty. In the current, 
highly volatile and competitive landscape, the horizon over which cash flows can be 
estimated confidently is shrinking, making it essential for firms to be flexible in their 
investment programs. The future is uncertain and as the dynamic investment path 
unfolds the firm’s management learns, adapts and revises investment decisions in 
response to unexpected market developments. An analysis of projects in a dynamic 
environment is often more complex than the standard (DCF) approaches may suggest, 
since they implicitly assume a static view of investment decisions and projected cash 
flow scenarios.1 The real options approach is more dynamic than the traditional 
approaches since it is capable of incorporating not only the value of flexibility and 
growth opportunities but also of competitive strategies in an uncertain environment. 2  
It is well accepted by now that the value of many strategic investments does not 
derive so much from direct cash inflows, as it does from the options to invest in future 
growth. Indeed, strategic plans often encompass projects which, if measured by cash 
flows alone, typically appear to have a negative net present value (NPV), when in fact 
they may have a positive total strategic value. An early investment in research and 
                                                          
1 The standard NPV methodology has obvious shortcomings in analyzing investment opportunities whose 
value derives from future growth options. NPV implicitly assumes such investment decisions are a 
“now or never” proposition; it does not take into account the value to “wait and see” and alter planned 
investment decisions as uncertainty gets resolved over time. 
2 A number of papers have addressed the importance of managerial flexibility.  Baldwin (1982) 
examines sequential investment strategies and interdependencies with future investment opportunities. 
She observes that if firms with market power wish to compensate for the loss in the value of future 
opportunities that result from undertaking a project now, they must require a positive premium over 
NPV. Myers (1987) suggests considering strategic investment opportunities as growth options, while 
Kester (1984) discusses qualitatively strategic and competitive aspects of growth opportunities.  Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis (1988, 1995, 1996a), Kemna (1988), Sick (1989), Smit (1996), and 
others, discuss many corporate options and provide various expositions of the real options approach to 
investment. 
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development (R&D), for instance, may seem unattractive if its direct measurable cash 
flows are considered in isolation. However, the potential profits from commercialization 
that may result from the research (and related spin-off applications) must be properly 
captured by determining the value of the underlying research program. Such a strategic 
R&D investment should not be seen as a one-time investment at the outset; proper 
analysis requires explicit consideration of its follow-on commercial options (i.e., to 
commercialize the end product of the R&D program) and related applications. The 
option perspective suggests that, as information over the success of R&D is revealed, 
management has flexibility to proceed with, terminate or otherwise alter its future 
investment plans. 
The new view of investment that treats opportunities as corporate real options 
has enriched modern corporate resource allocation and planning. The opportunity to 
invest can be seen as a call option, involving the right to acquire an asset for a 
specified price (investment outlay) at some future time. The underlying asset may be 
a package consisting of the project plus the value of other embedded corporate real 
options (e.g., to later expand production scale, abandon the project for its salvage 
value etc.). The techniques derived from option pricing can help quantify 
management’s ability to adapt its future plans to capitalize on favorable investment 
opportunities or to respond to undesirable developments in a dynamic environment by 
cutting losses.  
 “Wait-and-see” flexibility is clearly important in the evaluation of many 
investment opportunities under uncertainty. By delaying an investment decision, new 
information can be revealed that might affect the desirability of the investment, while 
management has the option to discontinue the project if market conditions turn out to 
be unfavorable. From this perspective, management should wait until a project is 
clearly desirable, requiring a premium over the zero-NPV value, reflecting the option 
value of deferment. Of course, from a strategic perspective it is not always advisable 
to defer investment. Besides the learning advantages of postponement, waiting may 
involve serious disadvantages. For example, management could lose early operating 
cash inflows when a fixed-life project is delayed, or miss out on a competitive first-
mover advantage.  An earlier (or heavier) strategic investment (say, to develop a new 
technology) may confer upon the pioneer firm a cost or timing advantage and 
influence the competitor’s behavior and the resulting equilibrium in a way that 
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strengthens the pioneer’s competitive position and long-term value. In other words, 
early investment commitment may have strategic benefits that must be weighted 
against the lost flexibility value component. These benefits and the resulting 
implications for competitive strategy can be captured with the help of basic game 
theory principles in combination with option valuation. 
In the organization of this paper we find it instructive to follow a step-by-step 
exposition. To introduce different aspects into the analysis one at a time we start with 
examples of proprietary investment decisions (options) under uncertainty, and later 
introduce the strategic dimension of competitive reactions. The next section uses two 
basic numerical examples to illustrate the application of real options valuation 
principles to mining and to R&D programs. Section 3 extends the analysis using basic 
game theory principles to discuss other strategic and competitive aspects, especially 
applicable to oligopolistic, innovative (high-tech) industries like consumer 
electronics. Section 4 examines the issue of competition vs. 
coordination/collaboration. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. BASIC VALUATION EXAMPLES: MINING AND R&D  
 This section presents two prototypical applications. The first example 
considers the valuation of a gold mine concession, where the current project value can 
be estimated using a traded financial instrument (gold futures) whose probabilistic 
behavior is close to that of a producing mine. The valuation of a license to develop the 
mine is treated analogous to the valuation of a simple call option. In the second 
example, we consider whether to invest in R&D and subsequent stages of 
commercialization. The multi-stage R&D investment decision can be viewed as a 
compound option (or option on an option). 
 
2.1 VALUING A MINE CONCESSION (LICENSE) 
 Following Brennan and Schwartz (1985), consider a firm that must decide 
whether to invest in a gold mine. The decision to develop the mine is irreversible, in 
that after development management cannot disinvest and recover the expenditure. To 
keep matters simple, suppose that development and extraction can be started 
immediately, requiring an investment outlay, I, of $4.5 million (m). There are no 
variable extraction costs. The gold reserves and the production profile, Qt, over time t, 
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is known ahead of time: production in year 1, Q1, is expected to be 4,000 ounces, and 
production in year 2, Q2, 10,000 ounces. 
 Uncertainty over the value of the project is closely related to the dynamics in 
gold prices. Currently, gold is priced at $300 per troy ounce; next year, the price will 
change. For simplicity, we assume two possible end-of-period prices after one period: 
price increasing (with a multiplicative factor u = 1.5) to S+ = $450, or price 
decreasing (with a multiplicative factor d = 0.67) to a value of S- = $200. Both prices 
are equally likely. In the subsequent year (t = 2), prices may rise or decrease again, 
and the same multiplicative factors will apply. Table 1 summarizes the possible gold 
prices (S), extraction quantities (Q), and the resulting operating cash flows, CF = 
Q.S.3 Suppose further that the risk-free interest rate r is 4% per year. 
 
TABLE 1. Quantities, Prices and Operating Cash Inflows of a Mine in Various States 
 
Period State Probability Gold price Quantity Cash inflow (Q.S) 
      (Nature) q  per ounce, S Q    CF (m)  
0      current     $300     
1      high   0.5  $450    4,000  $1.80  
1      low   0.5  $200    4,000  $0.80  
2      high, high  0.25  $675  10,000  $6.75 
2 high, low / low, high 0.5  $300  10,000  $3.00 
2      low, low   0.25  $133  10,000  $1.33 
 
  
Given the value of the investment outlay, the current gold price, and the dynamics in 
gold prices, is this a good investment? Should management invest now, or should it 
wait and see how the gold prices will develop? For an immediate investment decision, 
we need to determine the opportunity cost of capital and the net present value (NPV). 
The required return can be estimated from a traded financial instrument (gold) whose 
probabilistic behavior is close to that of the completed project. With a spot gold price 
of $300, the implied market-required return, k, for this risk can be derived from the 
expected gold prices over the next one-year period, or it can be derived from the 
expected gold prices over a two-year period:  
 
2)1(
133$25.0300$5.0675$25.0
1
200$5.0450$5.0300
kk +
×+×+×=+
×+×=  
                                                          
3 Some of the numbers in Table 1 are rounded. 
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The expectation of future gold prices presented above has an implied required rate of 
return equal to k = 8.33%. The NPV computation below shows that the present value 
of the expected cash inflows equals $4.2m. The NPV of the gold mine is $4.2m - 
$4.5m = -$0.3m; therefore, management would not invest in such a value-destructive 
project.  
 
NPV m m m m m m
m m m
= × + × + × + × + × −
= − = −
0 5 1 80 0 5 0 80
1 0833
0 25 6 75 0 5 3 00 0 25 1 33
1 0833
4 5
4 2 4 5 0 3
2
. $ . . $ .
.
. $ . . $ . . .
( . )
$ .
$ . $ . $ .
 
 
 Another approach to valuing the mine is to replicate the cash flows with an 
equivalent “twin” security rather than estimating the twin security’s required return. 
Consider the position of the company that owns the producing mine. The company’s 
position is long in gold. The company could offset this position and realize the value 
of the field today if management could sell short gold futures that exactly match the 
mine’s production over time. This particular project is lucrative for the corporation’s 
shareholders if the value of the covered position exceeds the investment outlay 
required for the project.  
 Consider, for instance, the dollar revenue of the mine at t = 2 equal to the 
production times the market price over two years, 10,000S2. The company can offset 
the price risk of this cash flow by selling future contracts short for 10,000 ounces of 
gold, with a futures price 0F2 and a dollar revenue (10,000)0F2 at t = 2. Since it can 
offset the risk of gold prices, this hedged position, Q2(0F2), can be seen as a certainty 
equivalent, CEQ2, of the uncertain operating cash flow at t = 2. In Equation (3) the 
present value of the certainty-equivalent cash flows is calculated using the risk-free 
rate, r,  as the appropriate discount-rate: 
 
 NPV Q F
r
Q F
r
I= + + + −
1 1 2 2
21 1( )
    (3) 
 
 What is the price of long-term contracts if they are traded in an arbitrage-free 
financial market? In arbitrage-free markets the expected future price, 0FT, equals the 
current spot price of gold, S0, plus the interest accrued until maturity T of this 
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position, i.e., 0FT = (1 + r)T-0 S0.4  Equations (4) and (5) calculate the present value of 
the certainty-equivalent cash flows using the theoretical futures prices, tFT = (1 + r)T-t 
St, where T - t is the time to maturity of the contract. 
 
 NPV
Q S r
r
Q S r
r
I= ++ +
+
+ −
1 0 2 0
2
2
1
1
1
1
( ) ( )
( )
    (4) 
 
= + − = × − = −( ) , $300 $4. $0.Q Q S I m m1 2 0 14 000 5 3  (5) 
 
 Equation (5) illustrates that we can replicate the cash flows of the mine with a 
gold “cash-and-carry” strategy. In other words, owning the mine is equivalent to 
owning a portfolio of gold. We are able to replicate the cash flows directly if we buy 
14,000 ounces of gold (the total amount of the reserves) today and sell 4,000 ounces 
at t = 1 and 10,000 ounces at t = 2. The current market value of this strategy and the 
value of the mine, therefore, equals 14,000($300) = $4.2m, and the NPV of the mine 
equals $4.2m - $4.5m = -$0.3m.  
 Not surprisingly, the NPV and the certainty-equivalent valuation approaches 
both result in the same answer (-$0.3m). In the NPV method, the risk adjustment was 
carried out in the denominator through an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate, k. In 
the certainty-equivalent method, the adjustment for risk is in the numerator, allowing 
the certainty-equivalent cash inflows to be discounted at the risk-free rate, r. Equation 
(4) reflects this relation.  
As a third variation, we could also calculate an (artificial) risk-neutral 
probability, p, of possible gold price up (and down) movements, which would allow 
us to calculate the CEQ from the possible gold prices.5 The risk-neutral probability is 
the one that would prevail if the underlying asset (in a risk-neutral world) were 
expected to earn the risk-free return (pS+ + (1 - p)S- = (1 + r)S). The risk-neutral 
probability, p, differs from the actual (true) probability, q. The risk-neutral probability 
                                                          
4 This assumes no convenience or dividend-like yield. Suppose that this relation does not hold and that 
the futures price is higher. Should this happen, a “cash-and-carry” arbitrage opportunity is available if 
traders short the contract and simultaneously buy the gold. At maturity, the gold is delivered, covering 
the short position in the futures contract. Hence, traders are unlikely to be willing to serve this “free 
lunch” for the company by selling futures. 
5 Because of the ability to replicate the mine with a specific gold position, its value is independent of 
investor risk attitudes and hence it is the same if investors were risk neutral. 
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is given by Equation (7) (see Trigeorgis and Mason, 1987), where S+ and S- are the 
possible gold prices in the up and down states next period, and r is the risk-free 
interest rate. 
 
 
r
CEQ
r
SpSp
k
SqSqS +=+
−+×=+
−+×=
−+−+
11
)1(
1
)1(
 (6) 
where: 
 ( ) −+
−
−
−+≡
SS
SSrp 1   (7) 
 
In the computation below we apply the risk-neutral valuation of Equation (6) to the 
above mine, using the risk neutral probability from (7): 
 
 ( ) 45.0
200450
20030004.01 =−
−+=p  
 
The resulting valuation again gives the same project value of -$0.3m: 
 
 
NPV m m
m m m m
m m m
= × + − × +
× + × + − × −
= − = −
0 45 1 80 1 0 45 0 80
1 04
0 45 6 75 2 0 45 0 55 3 00 1 0 45 1 33
1 04
4 5
4 2 4 5 0 3
2 2
2
. $ . ( . ) $ .
.
. $ . ( . . )$ . ( . ) $ .
.
$ .
$ . $ . $ .
 
 
 So far, replication of cash flows or properly discounting them at the required 
return has resulted in the same answer. We next examine situations in which NPV 
does not give the right answer. Capital investments are not usually a “now or never” 
proposition. Suppose that management can buy a one-year license that enables it to 
wait for a year and see how gold prices develop before making an investment in the 
project. If gold prices drop and the value of the mine declines below the required 
investment outlay, management can allow the license to expire. Figure 1 illustrates 
how this option to defer alters the shape (distribution) of the value of the mine. At a 
high gold price, the value of the mine equals $6.3m (Q x S = 14,000 x $450). At that 
value, management would invest $4.5m and the NPV would equal $6.3 m - $4.5m = 
$1.8m. At a low price, management would decide not to invest, as the value of the 
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project would be only $2.8m (< $4.5m). In this case, management would allow the 
license to expire and the value would be truncated to zero. 
 
FIGURE 1. Asymmetry in the Distribution of Project Value due to Flexibility 
 
 
V  =  6.3 m  
V  =  2.8 m   
   C  = MAX[ 6.3 -4.5, 0] = 1.8 m  
  C  = MAX[ 2.8 - 4.5, 0] = 0  
A:
B:
   INVEST  
  ABANDON  
?
 
 
 The standard NPV framework, which determines the present value of the 
expected cash inflows and the present value of expected outlays, does not give the 
right answer in this case. Under uncertainty, management has the flexibility to revise 
the investment decision as uncertainty over the value of the project gets resolved. The 
future investment decision is based on future gold prices, information that is not yet 
known. Decision tree analysis (DTA) can in principle capture this decision flexibility 
that cannot be handled well by static NPV. However, to find the appropriate discount 
rate (cost of capital) along each branch (gold price state) is not an easy task. As in a 
call option, the risk of the license changes each time its underlying value changes; the 
risk of the license is reduced if the price of gold --and the value of the mine-- 
increases. An option-based approach uses decision nodes (rather than passive event 
nodes) in modeling flexibility, with risk-neutral valuation capturing changes in risk in 
an appropriate manner. As with DTA, the valuation problem can be solved 
recursively, starting with future values and working backward along the tree. The 
resulting “certainty-equivalent” values can then be consistently discounted at the risk-
free rate, r. The value of the license in this way can be seen to equal: 
 
mm
r
CpCpV 78.0$
04.1
0)45.01(8.1$45.0
1
)1(
0 =×−+×=+
−+×=
−+
  (8) 
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where C +  and C -  denote the values of the option in the up (+) and down (-) states 
next period. Based on the expanded NPV criterion, the value of the license to invest 
has the following components: 
 
 Expanded NPV = (static) NPV + flexibility (or option) value  
$0.78m = -$0.3m + $1.08m  
 
 The risk-neutral valuation method used above is based on an underlying 
ability to replicate the value of the cash flows. In this case, management can create a 
gold portfolio in the financial markets that replicates the future payoff of the license. 
In order to truncate the resulting payoff, it can combine this gold portfolio with the 
risk-free asset. The position in gold in the replicating portfolio, N (the option delta or 
hedge ratio), would equal the spread in the value of the license ($1.8m - 0) divided by 
the spread in gold prices ($450 - $200). Table 2 shows that the synthetic license 
consists of a position of N = 7200 ounces in gold and a risk-free payment of $1.44m 
that exactly replicates the future truncated payoff of the mine (zero, $1.8m). If the 
gold price is low ($200), the value of this replicating portfolio equals 7200($200) - 
$1.44m = 0. If the price is high ($450), the value of the synthetic license equals 
7200($450) - $1.44m = $1.8m. 
 
TABLE 2. Replication of Mine Project Value (License) with a Gold Position 
 
 Low price ($200) High price ($450) 
 
7200 ounces gold      $1.44m    $3.24m 
Loan repayment (risk free) ($1.44m)   ($1.44m) 
Project value (license)       0      $1.8m 
 
  
Since the license and the replicating portfolio have the same future payoff in 
each gold price state, the value of the license today must be the current cost of 
constructing this replicating portfolio. Equation (9) estimates the value of the license 
using the position in gold (7200) multiplied by the current gold price ($300) and the 
present value of the risk-free loan ($1.44m/1.04). This results in a $0.78m value, 
exactly the same as found earlier when using the risk-neutral probabilities under the 
risk-neutral binomial valuation method: 
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N S0 + B = 7200 x $300 - $1.38m = $0.78m    (9) 
 
It is worth noting that in the valuation of the above gold mine we can use 
directly the principle of replicating future project cash flows. In R&D, however, an 
implementation problem with carrying out the replication argument of standard option 
pricing arises because a correlated financial instrument is non-existent. Nevertheless, 
the methodology can still be applied for valuing the contingent claim (investment 
opportunity) provided there is a corresponding valuation for the underlying asset 
(relative valuation). In this case the issue is to determine the market value of the 
project to a firm if it were traded in the financial markets, which is a standard 
assumption in traditional capital budgeting (see Mason and Merton, 1985).  
 
 
2.2 VALUING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
 Our second example concerns how to analyze an R&D program available to a 
high-tech company, and which technology strategy to pursue. As noted, R&D programs 
involve multiple contingent stages and thus should not be treated as isolated projects. The 
value of potential profits from follow-on commercial projects that may result from the 
research stage must be properly captured in determining the value of the underlying 
research program. Hence, the analysis requires explicit consideration of the project’s 
various stages: research & product development, and future commercialization.  
 Figure 2 shows the estimated cash flows of an R&D project available to a high-
technology company. Suppose the project involves a two-year upfront R&D phase, 
followed by expected cash inflows over a four-year period of commercialization. The 
R&D phase requires an immediate capital outlay of $15m, and an outlay of $50m as of 
year 1. The follow-on commercial project has expected cash inflows over the four-year 
period of CF3 = $200m, CF4 = $500m, CF5 = $700m and CF6 = $200m, and requires an 
outlay of I2 = $1,200m as of year 2. Even though the program appears to have a low 
return on investment, it may be profitable to develop the new technology to enhance the 
company’s future market position. 
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FIGURE 2.  Capital Outlays (↓) and Expected Cash Inflows (↑) for the R&D Project to 
Develop a New Technology, and the Potential Follow-on Commercial Project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 What is the value of the R&D program if management were to commit to both 
stages immediately? Its value at the beginning of commercial phase, V2, discounted at an 
opportunity cost of capital k = 15%, is $1127m, and its NPV2 therefore equals $1127m - 
$1200m = -$73m. Based on the expected scenario of a static NPV analysis, the 
commercialization project itself does not appear to be profitable. Calculating the present 
value as of t = 0, using an opportunity cost of 15%, results in a $852m value for the 
technology. The present value of the (certain) investment outlays for the entire program, 
discounted at the risk-free rate of 4%, equals $1109m for the commercial stage and $63m 
for the R&D stage. Thus, if the firm were to commit to both stages of the program right 
now, the total expected net value loss would amount to NPV = V0 - I0 = $852m - 
($1109m + $63m) = -$320m. 
 However, the firm does not have to commit to both stages immediately. Investing 
in R&D derives strategic value from generating the opportunity to commercialize later 
on, but implies no obligation to invest in the future commercial project. In other words, 
R&D is analogous to an option, in the sense that it creates a valuable future opportunity 
without committing the company to making the full investment. 
R&D
50 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Commercial Project
1200 
200 200 
500 
700 
15 
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 Is this technology strategy worth pursuing? To answer this question, we must 
consider two decisions: Should the R&D be undertaken, and if so, should the technology 
be implemented after R&D results are known?6 The opportunity to invest in the 
commercialization is like a call option with time to maturity of t = 2 years, and an 
exercise price of $1,200m. The underlying asset is the current (time zero) value of a 
claim on the commercial project’s expected future cash inflows of $852m. Suppose that 
uncertainty during the R&D phase results in a yearly increase or decline with 
multiplicative up and down factors, u = 1.5 or d = 0.67. The dynamics in the time 
series of commercial project values (V) are illustrated in the event tree of Figure 3 
below.  
 
FIGURE 3. Dynamics in the Value of the Commercial Project (in millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As with decision tree analysis (DTA), we can value the option at the end of the 
tree, starting at year 2 and working backward, using risk-neutral binomial option 
valuation. At the end of the R&D phase, management must decide whether to 
implement the technology. Consequently, the worst possible outcome for the 
implementation stage will be zero if the new technology is not used. Thus, at year two, 
the value of the option equals the highest of: The NPV of commercialization (V++ - 
$1,200m); or abandoning the technology (zero). As of year two this results in a net 
commercialization value of $717m [= 1917 – 1200] in the case events turn out better 
than expected, or a zero net value in the case of abandonment of the program (see the 
                                                          
6 See Kolbe et al. (1991). 
852 
 
1278 
 
852 
 
568 
1917 
 
379 
Better than expected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Worse than expected 
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end nodes of the option valuation tree of Figure 4). Under risk-neutral valuation, the 
current value of this claim can be determined from its expected future up and down 
values discounted at the risk-free interest rate (r = 4%), with expectations taken over 
the risk-neutral probabilities (p = 0.45). Stepping back in time (to t = 1) results in a 
zero value in the low state and a (0.45 × $717m + 0.55 × 0)/1.04 = $310m option 
value in the high state. Finally, as of year zero, the value of this growth option equals 
(0.45 × $310m + 0.55 × 0)/1.04 = $134m. 
 
FIGURE 4.  Net Value of the Option to Invest in the Commercial Project (in millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 After having estimated the option of investing in commercialization, we can now 
consider our first question: should the R&D program be undertaken in the first place? 
Investment in the R&D project can be viewed as exercising a compound option. The 
underlying value of the R&D option is the subsequent commercialization option, which 
has a value of $134m. The exercise price of the R&D compound option is the present 
value of the R&D outlays, which equal $63m. The worst possible outcome will be zero if 
management decides not to develop the new technology in the first place. The value of 
the R&D program therefore equals MAX[0, $134m - $63m] = $71m.  
 
   Expanded NPV = - $320m + $391m = + $71m 
 
134 
 
310 
 
MAX[852 - 1200, 0] = 0 
(abandon) 
0 
 
MAX[1917 - 1200, 0] = 717 
(invest) 
MAX[379 - 1200, 0] = 0 
(abandon) 
Year 0 
 
Year 1 Year 2 
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 In this case, management is justified to invest in R&D to prove the new 
technology and position itself to take advantage of a future growth option, despite the 
negative NPV of its expected cash flows (-$320m). Management should recognize that a 
wider range of possible outcomes would in fact increase the option value of 
commercialization. 
Both of the above examples where analyzed assuming the project is 
proprietary and its value is essentially unaffected by competitive moves. The next 
section considers situations prevailing in oligopolistic markets where a strategic 
investment by a firm has a direct impact on (and/or is affected by) competitors’ 
behavior. An expanded or strategic analysis (often relying on game theory principles) 
is then called for. 
 
 
3. STRATEGIC  (EXPANDED-NPV) ANALYSIS 
 As noted, a strategic investment entails “commitment value” by virtue of 
influencing the investment decisions of competitors (e.g., see Dixit (1979, 1980)). 
Consider a pioneer firm that invests early and aggressively on a large scale in a new 
geographic market. Competitors may view this strategic investment as a threat to their 
future profit base in this market, and in certain states (e.g., low demand) may choose 
to stay out altogether or enter later at a reduced scale to avoid a market-share battle. 
By reducing the likelihood of competitive intrusion, the strategic project can lead to 
higher long-term profits for the pioneer firm. 
 Shared investment opportunities in oligopolistic markets are exercised with 
the explicit recognition that they may invite competitive reaction, which in turn can 
impact the value of the investment opportunity for the incumbent. Under such 
conditions, a strategic investment no longer represents an internal value-optimization 
problem under uncertainty (i.e., against nature) as in standard option models that 
assume an exclusive opportunity. Rather, the shared investment now involves a 
strategic game against both nature and competition. Such a strategic investment plan 
should be based on an expanded or strategic NPV criterion that incorporates not only 
the passive (or direct) NPV of expected  cash flows from investing immediately and 
the flexibility value from active management (of the firm’s portfolio of operating real 
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options), but also the strategic (game-theoretic) value from competitive interactions. 
That is,  
 
Expanded (strategic) NPV = direct (passive) NPV + strategic (commitment) value +  
         flexibility value               (10) 
 
 
The box insert (Table 3) exhibits the strategic contexts of these basic game metaphors 
with an illustration using investment examples. In the classic “prisoner’s dilemma 
context,” firms have an incentive to invest immediately to avoid being pre-empted, 
which results in an erosion of flexibility value. The payoff of this competitive game 
may be positive, but less than had they followed a coordinated wait-and–see strategy. 
A similar strategic context can be found in the “Grab the Dollar” game, but here firms 
obtain a negative payoff when they end up investing simultaneously. The “grab the 
dollar” game illustrates the situation where the current market prospects are only 
favorable if one of the players invests but simultaneous investment results in a battle 
with a expected negative payoff. Only the first player captures the dollar (e.g., patent), 
but when they both enter the market, they both end up loosing in a battle. A dominant 
firm has an advantage to win this simultaneous game. The “burning the bridges” game 
explains that a firm can use the threat of a battle if it has a first-mover advantage and 
can make the first investment commitment to capture a large portion of the market. Of 
course, instead of fighting for a leading position in the market, firms may sometimes 
find it beneficial to follow an accommodating strategy to avoid a market battle.  The 
“battle of the sexes” game shows that in certain cases firms have an incentive to align 
their strategies and cooperate. 
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TABLE 3. Taxonomy of Game-theory Metaphors and Investment Applications 
 
Game-theory Metaphor Description  (Investment Analogy) Examples/Applications 
“Prisoners’ Dilemma”  
(Figure 5) 
 
Two people are arrested as 
suspects for a crime. The police 
puts the suspects in different 
cells to avoid communication. 
Each suspect is to be released if 
he testifies against the other. If 
neither confesses, both will get 
a lower punishment. 
 
The paradox is that the 
equilibrium outcome where 
both confess is worse for both 
prisoners, compared to the 
situation where neither 
confesses. 
Innovation Race 
 
 
Each of two innovative firms 
(players) faces two possible actions: 
invest early or wait. Competitive 
pressure to be the first (e.g., to 
acquire a patent) induces firms to 
invest early; each firm has a 
dominant strategy to invest due to the 
high value of commitment, triggering 
a situation where both firms invest 
receiving their second-worst payoff. 
If the two firms could coordinate 
their investment strategy they could 
share the flexibility benefits of the 
wait-and-see option, avoiding the 
inferior panic equilibrium where they 
rush to invest prematurely. 
 
 
 
In high-tech industries like consumer electronics, we 
often see firms getting into innovation races, even 
forming strategic partnerships to acquire a first-mover 
or time-to-market advantage that erode the value of 
wait-and-see flexibility from deferring investment.  A 
noted example is the intensely competitive race in 
memory chip development. In February 1997 Hitachi, 
Mitsubishi Electric and Texas Instruments announced 
they would jointly develop a one-gigabyte DRAM. 
NEC, which has been co-operating loosely with ATT-
spin-off Lucent Technologies and Samsung, 
announced in June 1997 that it had developed a 4-Gb 
DRAM.  
“Grab the Dollar”  
(Figure 6)Each of two players 
has two possible actions: grab 
the dollar or wait. In the 
complete information 
(symmetric) version of the 
game, a player wins the dollar 
if he is the only one who grabs, 
but loses if both players try to 
grab the dollar. The pay off of 
this Grab the Dollar variant is 
similar to the Prisoner’s 
dilemma game, but both players 
recognize that they have 
negative pay off if they both 
play tough. 
Innovation Race 
 
 
In the strategic context the market 
prospects are only favorable if one of 
the players invests, whereas 
simultaneous investment results in a 
battle with a negative expected 
payoff. Either one player captures the 
dollar (market) or the other, but 
when they both enter, they both loose 
in the resulting battle. In many 
emerging, high growth industries, the 
possibility of each firm pursuing 
independent R&D activities to 
capture the product standard may 
trigger a simultaneous similar 
investment by competitors that 
results in such a market battle.   
 
 
 
 
Under competitive pressure to be the first (e.g., in a 
patent race) competitors may rush to make parallel 
innovation investments simultaneously, with one or 
both sides potentially getting hurt. For instance, 
Novell got hurt due to competition in networking 
products, Apple lost its lead as a user-friendly 
computer with the development of Microsoft’s 
Windows, while in the 1980’s Philips got hurt from 
losing the race against Matsushita over the VCR 
standard. 
 
“Burning the Bridge” 
(Figure 7) 
 
Two opposing armies are asked 
to occupy an island in-between 
their countries, connected by 
bridges to both. Each army 
would prefer to let the island go 
to its opponent than fight. 
Army 1, who moves first, 
occupies the island and burns 
the bridge behind it (signaling 
Product Standard/Preemption 
 
 
Each firm (player) has two possible 
actions: high irreversible investment 
commitment or more flexible, low-
effort investment. The value of 
early/heavy commitment is that it 
may set the product standard or 
signal to competing firms about the 
reduced future profitability of their 
options in this market. Consider a 
 
 
 
Being the first in the market enables a firm to capture 
a larger share of the market and put followers on a 
strategic disadvantage. For instance, in cellular phones 
the early introduction of new models of a relatively 
small company like NOKIA, preempted a significant 
market share (compared to larger competitors). 
Competitors like Philips (who formed a partnership 
with Lucent Technologies) could not catch up and left 
this market. In an extreme case, the pioneer can 
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its commitment to fight). Thus 
army 2 has no option but let 
Army 1 keep the island, 
because it knows that Army 1 
has no choice but fight back if 
they attack.  
The paradox of commitment is 
winning the game by reducing 
your options (burning the 
bridge). 
pioneer firm that makes an early, 
large-scale irreversible R&D 
investment in a new market. The 
firm’s competitors could view this as 
a threat to their future profit base in 
the market, thus deciding to stay out 
or entering the market later on a 
reduced scale to avoid a market share 
battle.  
capture the product standard early on. For instance, 
Intel preempted 80% of the microprocessor market 
with its Pentium microchip that became the product 
standard, forcing competitors like Digital to retreat 
from the market, even though Digital’s Alpha chip 
was three to four times as powerful as the Pentium 
chip at a fraction of the cost.  
 
“Battle of the Sexes” 
(Figure 8) 
 
A couple must choose between 
going to a movie or to a play. 
The couple prefers going 
somewhere together that 
separately, one prefers the 
movie and the other the play. 
 
The couple would be better of 
to collaborate, sometimes going 
to a movie and other times to a 
play. 
 
 
Standardization Game 
 
 
Two  (alliances of) firms must 
choose between standard A or  
standard B. Everyone would be 
better off with one standard 
(avoiding a “war of attrition”), but 
for one firm standard A would be the 
best, while for the other firm it is 
standard B. 
 
 
 
In the standardization game of the high density 
disk, on one side was an alliance between Toshiba 
and Time Warner who had jointly developed a 
super density disk (SDD); on the other side was an 
alliance among Philips and Sony with their 
multimedia compact disk (MMCD). In this high-
density CD battle, both sides recognized that the 
launch of more than one system would result in 
confusion and major capital waste, particularly for 
the losing company as well as the consumers. A 
standardization agreement resulted in increased 
productivity and expanded markets for both. 
 
 
 
 
The following sections illustrate these ideas with a series of examples, ranging from a 
symmetric decision to launch an R&D project (faced by two comparable 
competitors), to an asymmetric game involving different degrees of R&D effort and 
the possibility of complete preemption, to a game of R&D competition versus 
collaboration via joint R&D ventures or strategic alliances.7 
 
 
                                                          
7 See Dixit and Nalebuff (1993) for various applications of games. 
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3.1 TIME TO LAUNCH UNDER COMPETITION (SYMMETRIC INNOVATION RACE)  
 Consider first the example of an innovation race involving a shared R&D 
option among two consumer electronics firms, P (Philips) and S (Sony).8 Both firms 
plan to develop an interactive CD technology and expect subsequent 
commercialization applications. The total market value (NPV-pie) from immediate 
investment (whether by a single firm or shared equally among the two firms) is 
$400m. The additional value of the flexibility to “wait and see” under demand 
uncertainty (had there been no competition) is $200m. This results in a total (shared) 
opportunity value (option pie or expanded-NPV) of $600m if the two firms could 
fully appropriate the flexibility value of waiting.  
 The 2 x 2 table in Figure 5 summarizes the payoffs (firm P, firm S) in four 
investment-timing scenarios: (i) when both firms invest immediately (simultaneously) 
they share equally the total NPV (½ × 400), resulting in a (200, 200) value payoff for 
each firm; (ii)/(iii) when one firm (P or S) invests first while the other waits it 
preempts its competitor and captures the full NPV value (400) for itself, resulting in a 
payoff of (400, 0) or (0, 400), respectively; and (iv) when both firms decide to wait 
they share equally the value of the investment option (½ × 600), resulting in a (300, 
300) payoff. 
 
FIGURE 5.  Innovation Race: Competitive Pressure to be First Induces Firms to Invest 
Prematurely, even though they Could Both be Better off to Wait (“Prisoners’ 
Dilemma”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Payoff in each cell is for (firm P, firm S). 
Strategies of firm P: wait (upper row) or invest (lower row) 
Strategies of firm S: wait (left column) or invest (right column) 
                                                          
8 This prototypical example uses hypothetical numbers. 
Invest 
Wait 
Firm P 
Firm S
Wait Invest 
(300, 300)
  (200, 200)*(400, 0) 
(0, 400) 
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The above value-payoff structure results in a Nash-equilibrium outcome where 
both firms invest  (200, 200). Firm P’s payoff from immediate investment (lower row) 
exceeds its payoff from a wait-and-see strategy (upper row), regardless of which 
strategy firm S chooses (400 > 300 in left “wait” column, 200 > 0 in right “invest” 
column); that is, firm P has a dominant strategy to invest, regardless of the timing 
decision of its competitor. Firm S also has a dominant strategy to invest regardless of 
P’s decision, resulting in a Nash equilibrium (*) outcome in the lower right cell, from 
which neither firm can improve by making a unilateral move; thus, both firms receive 
their second-worst payoff of (200, 200), an example of the well-known prisoners’ 
dilemma.9  Obviously, here both firms would be better off  to collaborate or 
coordinate and fully appropriate the option value of waiting (300, 300). 
 
 
3.2 ASYMMETRIC INNOVATION RACE AND PREEMPTION 
 Let us revisit the above innovation race among the two firms, P and S, but in 
another strategic context. If both firms invest they end up in a market share battle 
with a negative payoff. Suppose now that firm P has an edge in developing the 
technology, although it has limited (financial or other necessary) recourses at the 
time. Competitor S may take advantage of this resource weakness and try to win the 
race to the market. Following Dixit and Nalebuff (1993), each firm can choose how 
intense an effort to make in developing this innovative technology. Less effort is 
consistent with a (technological) follower strategy involving lower development costs 
but is more flexible (safe) in case of unfavorable developments. More effort 
corresponds to a (technological) leader strategy involving higher development costs 
that could result in earlier product launch and a first-mover cost advantage. 
 Figure 6 illustrates the payoffs resulting if the competitors follow a 
(technological) leader or follower strategy (high or low R&D effort) when they are in 
an asymmetric power position. In this payoff table, both sides regard a high-effort 
R&D battle as their worst scenario: for firm S because it is likely to loose an all-out 
                                                          
9 In the classic prisoners’ dilemma, two prisoners accused of a crime would be worse off if they both 
confess (200, 200) than if they do not (300, 300), but the fear of the other prisoner confessing (0, 400) 
puts pressure for both to do so even though not confessing would have been preferable for both. 
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race, and for firm P because it would incur large costs. Suppose that this situation 
results in a (-$100m, -$100m) payoff. 
 The next-worst scenario for each competitor is to exert low effort while its 
competitor chooses a high-effort R&D strategy. This entails spending money with 
little chance of success, resulting in a payoff of only $10m. Under firm S’s 
technological leader strategy, it develops its interactive CD technology by exerting 
high effort ($200m), while firm P follows with a low-effort follower strategy. In the 
best scenario for firm P, both firms avoid an intense innovation race and make a low-
effort investment, with firm P more likely to win due to its technological edge and 
lower cost (resulting in a payoff of $200m for P, $100m for S). 
 
FIGURE 6. (Simultaneous) Innovation Race with High vs. Low R&D Effort 
(Asymmetric “Grab the Dollar” Game) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Note: Payoff in each cell is for (firm P, firm S). 
Strategies of firm P: low-effort R&D (upper row) or high-effort R&D (lower row) 
Strategies of firm S: low-effort R&D (left column) or high-effort R&D (right column) 
 
 Consider the equilibrium implications of an asymmetric payoff structure as 
that of the “Grab the Dollar” game in Figure 6 above.10 Firm P’s payoff for pursuing a 
low-effort R&D strategy (upper row) exceeds the payoff of a high-effort strategy 
                                                          
10 This is an asymmetrical variant of the “Grab the Dollar” game, in that both firms have a negative 
payoff if they both make a high R&D effort, and there is  a positive payoff if only one of them follows 
a  high-effort strategy. Only Firm S has a dominant position in playing this game, reflected in its higher 
pay off. 
High 
Low 
Firm P 
Firm S 
Low High 
($200m, $100m)
(-$100m, -$100m)($100m, $10m) 
($10m, $200m)*
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(lower row), no matter which strategy firm S chooses ($200m > $100m and $10m > -
$100m). Thus, firm P has a dominant strategy to pursue low-effort R&D. Given this, 
firm S will pursue a high-effort R&D strategy (since $200m > $100m). The Nash 
equilibrium (*) outcome of this R&D rivalry game is given by the top right cell ($10, 
$200), where P receives its second worst payoff. P would follow a flexible, low-effort 
strategy, while S would follow the high-effort R&D strategy. 
 Consider next a similar situation (as the simultaneous innovation race of 
Figure 6 above), but with the difference that firm P can make the R&D investment 
before firm S can decide which strategy to follow. Which R&D strategy should firm P 
follow? Management must now recognize that its investment decisions will directly 
influence competitive reaction, as illustrated in the sequential game of Figure 7. The 
threat of a market battle could actually work in firm P’s favor. 
 
FIGURE 7. Sequential Investment Game with High vs. Low R&D Effort (“Burning the 
Bridges”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If firm P pursues a flexible low-effort strategy (making a small R&D 
investment), firm S will respond with high effort, and firm P’s payoff will be $10m. 
However, if P pursues a high-effort R&D strategy, firm S can be expected to respond 
with low effort (since $10m > -$100m), in which case P’s payoff will be $100m. 
Therefore, firm P would invest heavily in R&D, signaling a credible commitment to 
Low  
effort 
Low  
effort 
S 
Low  
effort 
High  
effort 
High  
effort 
High  
effort 
S 
P 
($200m, $100m) 
(-$100m, -$100m) 
($100m, $10m)*
($10m, $200m) 
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the high-effort R&D strategy (with the competitor responding with a low-effort 
strategy). With such a strategic timing move, the equilibrium results in a more 
desirable payoff for firm P ($100m) than that of the earlier (simultaneous) game 
($10m). 
 This strategy represents an early exercise of a shared multistage R&D option 
and it explicitly influences both competitive behavior and the firms’ future profit 
base. In our strategic (expanded-NPV) framework, an immediate high-effort R&D 
strategy (technological leadership) has two main effects on value, with opposite sign: 
 (i) A standard option-value or flexibility effect. This reflects management's 
ability to wait to invest in the business under uncertain conditions. The large (early) 
investment implicit in the high-effort R&D strategy, although enhancing the value of 
future growth opportunities, sacrifices this flexibility value compared to a more 
flexible low-effort strategy.  
(ii) A strategic commitment effect. A large (early) R&D investment consistent 
with technological leadership and a high-effort strategy can influence competitors’ 
investment decisions and the equilibrium outcome favorably for the pioneer firm (P), 
giving it an asymmetric competitive edge. This must be weighted against the loss of 
flexibility value. 
In certain cases, however, efforts to create asymmetric power positions vis-à-
vis a competitor must be given up in favor of more fully appropriating the option 
value of a coordinated wait-and-see strategy under demand uncertainty. 
 
 
4. COMPETITION VS. COORDINATION/ STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
In an oligopolistic industry, firms can make prior investments in R&D to 
increase their ability to capture the growth opportunities in the industry. This section 
considers the issue of whether (and when) it is optimal to compete independently or 
coordinate (e.g., via standardization agreements) and otherwise collaborate (e.g., via 
joint R&D ventures or strategic alliances) in the innovation phase, to increase the 
total value of growth opportunities in the industry under uncertainty. Section 4.1 
examines the competition vs. coordination (standardization) game in the high-density 
disk market, while section 4.2 discusses learning and across-time evolution in a given 
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industry (consumer electronics) from a competitive mode (in VCRs) to one of 
strategic alliances (in the launch of the CD). 
 
4.1  STANDARDIZATION IN THE HIGH-DENSITY DISK 
 Consider the innovation battle for the development of the high-density disk. 
Initially, it might seem as if this effort would end up in a technological war. Instead, it 
ended up in a coordination game. On one side was an alliance between Toshiba and 
Time Warner who had jointly developed a super density disk (SDD). On the other 
side were Philips and Sony with their multimedia compact disk (MMCD). The storage 
capacity of the old CD (70 minutes for a movie) had become insufficient; with new 
compression techniques and the use of two layers, the storage capabilities of the new-
generation disk could increase ten times to 7.4 gigabytes, and even more for the 
Toshiba disk.11 The new technology was expected to result in valuable growth 
opportunities in audio CD, CD-ROM (information storage), digital video disc (DVD), 
and other CD applications. 
 Both sides claimed victory in advance, hoping to enhance the “commitment 
value” of their technology by influencing competitive behavior. For instance, both 
firms made strategic moves by making advance announcements of the launch of their 
high density players and disk, listing the computer producers who had chosen their 
systems, emphasizing the success of their R&D efforts, even providing misleading 
information about the capabilities of each other’s systems.12 
 The game below describes the strategic context of the dilemma faced by the 
two parties (alliances). Each side would prefer to launch their own standard but 
clearly would be better off to avoid a market battle. Figure 8 describes the four 
outcomes in a  2 × 2 game. The worst payoffs for both parties, (2, 1) and (1, 2), are for 
the situation in which both pursue exclusionary (adversarial) technological strategies 
and develop competing product standards. This would result in intense competition, 
but eventually uncertainty will get resolved over which one will be the winning 
system. The two parties would clearly be better off with a single standard to avoid a 
                                                          
11  Toshiba’s disk, however, had the disadvantage of being double sided. 
12 For example, Toshiba announced that its competitor, Philips, would not develop a rewritable CD 
version. Philips called this untrue: “Of course we are working on that. However, we have to protect the 
copyright first before we launch the product.” In this aggressive strategic context, the competitor’s 
managers made threatening statements at that time, e.g., “We are in a state of war” (NRC 5-7-95). 
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war of attrition, but each alliance would prefer their own standard to prevail. This 
results in payoffs of (3, 4) or (4, 3) when both choose a standard based on SSD or on 
MMCD, respectively.  
 
FIGURE  8. The 2 × 2 Competition vs. Coordination Game (“Battle of the Sexes”) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
 By recognizing the above strategic context, however, both firms will have an 
incentive to coordinate their product strategy to avoid a market battle. Standardization 
agreements may result in increased productivity and expanded markets for both. In 
the high-density CD battle, both sides recognized that the launch of more than one 
system would result in confusion and major capital waste, particularly for the losing 
company and the consumers. A “technical working group” representing the leading 
firms in the computer industry investigated the competing systems and found that 
both the MMCD of Philips and Sony as well as the SDCD of Toshiba fulfilled the 
requirements. The computer industry, which would benefit if the two alliances would 
agree on one standard, encouraged the two sides to negotiate and coordinate.13  
  
4.2  LEARNING:  FROM COMPETITION IN VCRS TO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE 
LAUNCH OF CDS 
                                                          
13 Subsequently, the strategic moves of these firms (as reported in the press) changed from tough to 
accommodating. The vice president of Philips made accommodating statements about coming to one 
standard. The outcome would be a new standard for the next twenty years. The expectations were that 
over five years 200 million pieces of CD-carrying equipment would be sold yearly. Multimedia sales 
would represent 10% of total sales. 
Standard based on 
SDD  
Standard based on 
MMCD 
Standard based on 
SDD 
 
(4, 3) 
Philips 
Competition 
 
 (2, 1) 
 
 (3, 4) 
 
(1, 2) 
 Standard based on MMCD 
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 In consumer electronics, firms like Philips, Sony, Matsushita, and Toshiba have 
a history of competing in the development of technologically innovative products, 
such as CD players, CDi, walkman, 100 Hz TV, and the high density disk. Innovative 
strategies are often accompanied by high commercial and technological risk. Such 
strategies may also require close contact with customers and careful monitoring of 
competition. It is possible that firms may compete in one product and cooperate on 
another. As noted, strategic alliances with some competitors that use mutual 
standardization agreements can help win the battle in the competition between 
different systems. 
 Consider the battle for developing a technology standard in the video recorder 
market. In the late seventies, the introduction of three types of video recorders 
resulted in intense rivalry. Philips launched the V2000 system to compete with Sony’s 
Betamax and JVC’s VHS system. Instead of following a single standard, Philips 
decided to make the V2000 system incompatible with VHS tapes, claiming that the 
advantage of reversible tapes and better slow-motion pictures was sufficient to win 
adequate market share. The aggressive position by these companies resulted in an 
intense market share battle in the video recorder market.  
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Figure 9 illustrates the market share battle 
between Sony, JVC, and Philips. Uncertainty 
concerning Philips´ market share compared to 
the other systems is reflected by the states of 
nature (Ο). The branches in bolded type in the 
upper part of the tree illustrate the historic 
path of actions actually taken by the players 
involved and the resolution of uncertainty. 
 The market for consumer video 
recorders increased rapidly. Sony (with its 
Betamax system)  and JVC (with VHS) were 
already involved in a market share battle 
before Philips introduced the V2000. Philips 
decided not to make its system compatible 
with the existing VHS system, but 
unfortunately its claimed technical advantage 
was not reflected commercially in a larger 
market share. The existing systems had 
already developed a large captive market and 
were supported with software (movies). 
 It should have been clear from the 
beginning that only one of the systems could 
win, and that in the end only one could 
become the standard in the market. The other 
firms eventually would have to switch to this 
system. Hence, each player must have 
believed they had at least a good chance of 
winning in order to be willing to participate in 
this battle.  
 
FIGURE 9. Timing Product Launch with 
Multiple Competitors 
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FIGURE 10.  The “War of Attrition” Game 
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The above situation could be viewed as an 
optimal stopping problem against 
competition with uncertainty over the future 
value of the project. In a “war of attrition” 
game such as this, the winner takes all. This 
is more likely to occur in an industry in 
which economies of scale are important (see 
Tirole, 1990, pp. 311). Fighting is costly 
because it may lead to low or negative profits 
and R&D outlays may not be recovered. The 
object of the fight is to induce the rival to 
give up. The winning firm acquires the 
standard, and the losers are left wishing they 
had never entered the fight. Figure 10 
illustrates the “war of attrition” game for the 
video recorder market. The game ends when 
it becomes clear that one of the players has 
either quit, or switched to another system. 
The historic path of this game is represented 
by the bolded-type branches. Philips suffered 
intense competition as unfavorable 
information was revealed (low market share), 
and in the end it switched to the VHS system. 
The VHS system by JVC (Matsushita) 
became the market standard. 
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 By contrast, in the subsequent development of the CD technology, Philips 
recognized that the CD player would be a success only if other firms would be willing 
to produce CDs and CD players. Philips and Sony exchanged licenses to acquire an 
install-base for the CD player. The joint development of the CD turned out to be a 
success, resulting in a range of subsequent growth opportunities.14  
The above examples from the launching of video recorders and the 
development of the CD technology clearly illustrate the potential use of options 
concepts and game theory principles in understanding competitive behavior under 
uncertainty in such oligopolistic markets. The commitment value of a firm’s strategy 
can be enhanced by outsmarting competition under conditions of asymmetrical 
information or power, as well as and of technical and commercial uncertainty. Under 
other circumstances, however, market characteristics, demand uncertainty and 
competitive moves may change a firm’s aggressive strategy to a collaborative one.  
 
 
5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper has reviewed some basic valuation principles involving real 
options and competitive strategy analysis.  Numerical examples from valuation of a 
license on a mine concession and an R&D program illustrated the shortcomings of 
traditional NPV when management has flexibility to adapt its future contingent 
decisions based on the evolution of major uncertainties. In oligopolistic industries, we 
discussed (using basic game theory) a number of examples involving innovation races 
and other competitive games where the impact of a firm’s decision on competitors is 
important in determining equilibrium outcomes and competitive strategies. A number 
of insights and implementation issues are summarized below. 
We have shown why risk-neutral option valuation or a certainty equivalent-
based approach is superior to traditional DCF or decision tree analysis, since it 
combines the use of decision nodes (rather than passive event nodes) to model 
                                                          
14 A couple of decades later, it appears that the development of the CD has been a far greater success 
than initially expected. In 1995, total sales for the entire market using this technology came to about 
$50 billion. Three billion CD’s and about 110 million pieces of CD-carrying equipment have been sold 
annually. 
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flexibility choices while being more careful to price risk correctly in each branch 
(state) of the tree. In the implementation in natural resources, management can use 
directly the concept of replicating future cash flows. The estimated value of a 
producing field can be directly linked to oil futures.  An insufficient set of market 
quotes of a correlated financial instrument (e.g., futures or forward contracts) is a 
general implementation problem of the option pricing methodology (and it is non-
existent in the valuation of R&D programs). However, the methodology can still be 
applied provided there exists a corresponding valuation for the underlying asset.  
The combined options and game theory perspective is particularly relevant for 
oligopolistic and innovative industries (e.g., pharmaceuticals or consumer electronics) 
facing high research and development costs in several phases in a technologically 
uncertain and competitive setting. The war of attrition in video systems, the 
coordination game of the CD technology, and the adversarial and accommodating 
strategies for the high density disk are just a few examples of games that corporations 
face in real life. Firms can make prior investments in R&D to improve their 
competitive position and their ability to capture the growth opportunities in the 
industry. Patents and proprietary use of information can prevent the creation of 
valuable opportunities for competition. In cases of differentiated products under 
contrarian, quantity-type competition (e.g., in pharmaceuticals), opposition is more 
likely to retreat. However, it not always wise to compete aggressively. An important 
aspect in corporate strategy is knowing when to coordinate strategies with 
competition and support rivals. When the product is homogeneous and competitive 
response is reciprocating, as in price competition (e.g., in the airline, the tobacco or 
the food industries), adversarial strategies may result in price wars and erosion of 
profit margins for all sides.15 
 While adversarial strategies and a lack of coordination may result in shrinking 
markets, the gains from sharing information and the benefits of innovation may result 
in higher productivity and profits for all under certain circumstances. With an 
accommodating strategy, firms can work closely together (e.g., appropriating the 
option value of waiting more fully as well as sharing costs) and may achieve more 
innovation and growth. Firms often co-operate in R&D via standardization 
  32
agreements, joint R&D ventures or create other forms of strategic alliances. Philips 
formed several joint ventures, such as with Matsushita Electronics. A potential 
downside is that while these ventures may strengthen the firm’s position, they may 
also be helping build up new competitors. 
The combined option pricing and game theory approach, when properly 
applied, can be a valuable tool of analysis in support of the overall corporate strategy. 
These quantitative tools are meant to complement the strategic thinking process and 
executive intuition and experience, not to replace them. Overly complicated methods are 
not easily adopted and face managerial resistance. Complex real-life investment 
problems often have to be simplified to their basic components to make the analysis more 
feasible. Real options valuation helps do that. To make the model easier to understand, it 
is more useful to use a discrete-time binomial process. Working backward in the option-
game tree, decision-makers can trace the equilibrium project values and intuit from the 
model the relative magnitude of values in the different project phases. To use the model 
as a practical aid to corporate planners, appropriate user-friendly software will be useful. 
Real options concepts and tools are being increasingly used by consulting firms and 
leading corporations around the world in a variety of industries.  The practical use of 
real option analysis looks quite promising. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 As a result firms may try to differentiate their products with marketing expenses to avoid pure 
competition in prices. 
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